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Lee Kuan Yew’s Singapore Bloomed in 
the Shadow of the Cold War 
Singapore’s rise can’t be separated from the context of the 
Cold War in Southeast Asia. 
 
By Wen-Qing Ngoei 
March 28, 2017 
 
Vigorous debate over the legacy of Singapore’s first prime minister, Lee Kuan Yew, 
has continued since his death on March 23, 2015. Many credit Lee’s 31-years at the 
helm of the country (1959-1990) for vaulting Singapore from a “slum-ridden trading 
post” to a global metropolis. Others criticize what they consider Lee’s authoritarian 
tendencies, contending that he squashed his political opponents by labeling 
them communists and detaining them without due process. Indeed, Lee admitted in 
a 2010 interview that he had done “some nasty things, locking fellows up without 
trial,” but argued that his was an “honorable purpose” since these “fellows” were 
communists intent on hijacking the democratic process. Thus, some believe that 
Lee’s allegedly authoritarian ways brought Singapore wealth and security, and 
Western observers should question if their political freedoms actually trump the 
material comforts that Singaporeans enjoy. 
These views overstate to extent to which Singapore’s economic boom was a function 
of Lee’s so-called authoritarian rule. It’s a tempting conclusion to reach — Lee’s 
presence dominates Singapore’s history as an independent nation, and Singapore got 
rich while other countries of the global south fell behind despite oodles more natural 
resources. This prompts some to call the city-state exceptional. But this narrative 
holds Singapore’s history separate from its Southeast Asian neighbors, from the 
vortices of decolonization and the Cold War. It presumes that Singapore’s success 
arose from causes within its boundaries, from the domestic policies of Lee and his 
colleagues when Singapore exited the Malaysian Federation in 1965. 
Analyses of Lee’s tenure typically overlook how much Singapore benefited from the 
Cold War. In fact, Singapore’s economy enjoyed a running start because Britain 
clung to its air and naval bases in Singapore for decades after World War II, hoping 
to buttress Britain’s status as a world power. Britain’s Singapore bases underpinned 
its Cold War military commitment to the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization 
(SEATO). And as the CIA learned in 1967, Britain had been pumping almost $200 
million annually into the Singapore economy to maintain its military installations on 
the island. These bases contributed 20 percent of Singapore’s national income, 
providing employment for 36,000 Singaporeans. Current Singapore Prime Minister 
Lee Hsien Loong has stated that Britain’s withdrawal from the bases in the late 1960s 
actually threatened the livelihoods of 150,000 Singaporeans. 
It wasn’t just that Britain refused to leave. Lee and his colleagues valued the bases’ 
economic contribution. Lee even strove to deflect the criticisms of non-aligned 
leaders that the British bases made Singapore a neocolonial puppet. In the early 
1960s, he visited the major non-aligned leaders of Asia and Africa to convince them 
that British forces remained in Singapore only at the pleasure of Singaporeans, that 
he could turn the British out at any time. Most non-aligned nations accepted Lee’s 
argument because he was persuasive and, anyway, many non-aligned states 
maintained similar military ties with their former colonial rulers or had forged new 
ones with one or more of the ascendant Cold War powers. However, Indonesian 
President Sukarno continued until he was ousted (between 1965 and 1967) to insist 
that Britain’s Singapore bases served British neocolonial designs. Sukarno remarked 
in his autobiography: “Colonialism wasn’t retreating in my backyard, just changing 
shape.” But absent significant resistance from the non-aligned world against 
Britain’s Singapore bases, the country enjoyed additional years of the fading 
empire’s bounty. 
When Britain finally relinquished its Singapore bases in 1971, Singapore did not 
lack for a new, powerful and rich patron. Singapore thrived as a something of a war 
economy as America, the USSR, and China engaged in their proxy war in Indochina. 
In 1967, a full 15 percent of Singapore’s national income derived from U.S. military 
procurements for Vietnam. Furthermore, Singapore served as Southeast Asia’s 
regional petroleum-refining center, crucial to the U.S. war machine. Lockheed 
Corporation had set up shop on the island for commercial reasons as well as to repair 
and maintain aircraft being deployed for the U.S. intervention in Vietnam. More 
American monies flowed into Singapore as the Vietnam War ground on. In 1971, 
U.S. officials found in that American private investment in Singapore had begun to 
grow at a phenomenal $100 million a year. 
Enjoying this article? Click here to subscribe for full access. Just $5 a month. 
Here, too, Lee played an important role. He repeatedly cajoled U.S. leaders to 
support the Saigon government. After his first official visit to America as 
Singapore’s prime minister in October 1967, Lee wrote President Lyndon Johnson 
that his support for the U.S. war in Vietnam was “unequivocal,” that it bought time 
for states to stabilize their governments and economies. Traveling throughout the 
United States that October, Lee continually told the American press that Southeast 
Asia would accommodate to communism if America abandoned Vietnam. Johnson 
valued Lee’s support and promised to “keep on a steady course in Vietnam.” Lee 
later cultivated relations with the Nixon administration, promising to persuade the 
American public not to “sell out” Saigon. American troops would fight in Vietnam 
till 1973. Several extra years of U.S. military procurements (and rising numbers of 
American companies setting up in Singapore) certainly helped the Singaporean 
economy, too. 
Lee’s strategy for Singapore in the Cold War was not exceptional. Malaysian Prime 
Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman also cleaved to America as British power waned; he 
supported the U.S. war in Vietnam and tried to win more American investment. Thai 
military elites resolutely aligned their country with America from 1950 onward and 
reaped many rewards. For his part, Sukarno claimed he was non-aligned but strung 
all the Cold War powers along to access their war chests. Likewise, while Lee and 
his colleagues toiled over domestic policies to drive Singapore’s economic 
development, they readily exploited the transnational conflict that buffeted all newly 
independent nations. Most non-aligned nations tried their hands at this game during 
the Cold War; Lee and his lieutenants happened to play it quite well. 
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